Volume 17, Number 4

Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol with Forward Secrecy for Securing Cyber Physical Systems

  Authors

Sung-Woon Lee ¹ and Hyunsung Kim ², ¹ Tongmyong University, Korea, ² Kyungil University, Korea

  Abstract

As Internet of Things (IoT) technologies become increasingly embedded within cyber-physical systems (CPS), safeguarding communications and protecting data have emerged as significant challenges. Existing authenticated key agreement protocols play a fundamental role in securing these systems, but many fail to provide adequate protection against evolving security threats, particularly in terms of forward secrecy. This paper conducts an in-depth cryptanalysis of a newly introduced authentication protocol, highlighting its failure to provide forward secrecy-a crucial feature that maintains communication confidentiality even in the event that the long-term key is exposed. Through detailed analysis, we identify several vulnerabilities within the protocol, particularly its inability to withstand attacks targeting session key exposure. Building on these findings, we propose a new authenticated key agreement protocol specifically designed to enhance security in CPS environments. Our proposed protocol integrates forward secrecy, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access to a device's long-term key, communications remain protected. The protocol aims to deliver robust security assurances with minimal computational demands, rendering it particularly well-suited for IoT devices with limited resources. Our evaluation assesses its security, efficiency, and scalability, and the results indicate that it outperforms current alternatives. The proposed protocol offers a robust, forward secrecy-enabled solution for securing CPS communications, providing a solid foundation for the future of secure IoT networks in critical applications.

  Keywords

Security Protocols, Authentication, Key Agreement, Cyber Physical System, Forward Secrecy .