MIMICKING A COMPLETE LIFE-CYCLE OF FIAT CURRENCY IN ONE E-CASH SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

The electronic cash was introduced by Chaum in 1982 and now many e-cash systems have been proposed in order to mimic the fiat currency. Bitcoin provides us with an attractive way to construct a decentralized e-cash system. Ideally, we would like to make the system more practical, for example, the users can be able to transfer coins between each other multiple times and they can also withdraw arbitrary amount of coins rather than one or the predefined number, so that in the spend protocol the user can spend any amount of valid coins.

In this paper, we propose a provably secure and more practical e-cash system. Firstly, it can provide the anonymous transfer of coins between users, so that the merchant can spend the received coins further; secondly, the user can withdraw arbitrary amount of coins rather than the one or predefined number; thirdly, during the transfer of coins, the coins have a fixed size; finally, the fair exchange between the users can also be achieved.

KEYWORDS

E-cash, fiat currency, coin, anonymous, preventing double-Spending, fair exchange.

1. INTRODUCTION

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Bitcoin [1] is the most prominent cryptocurrencies, whose security does not rely on any single trusted third party and the transaction ledger is publicly available. But now the cash is still the most prevalent payment method in real life because that cash transaction is anonymous, transferable and it can prevent the double-spending attack. Furthermore, there exists no unfair exchange when the users exchange with physical cash. Here we focus on the construction of a more practical e-cash system [2] that can simulate the physical currency better. It is known that the proof of coins' validity is based on some personal message, which is easy to break the users' privacy. Moreover, in the e-cash system, the user withdraws coins from the bank then sends it to the merchant who must deposits it to the bank rather than spends it further. And in the trustless network, the unfairness occurs between users, e.g., the malicious payer or payee can refuse to sending the valid messages.

Obviously, the ideal e-cash system should be equipped with the same security properties of the physical cash. There has been number of works aim to solve these problems, but these works usually solve several problems and also bring some new problems, for example, using malleable signature to achieve the transitivity of coins [3], so the users can get a valid signature of another message according to some transformation without communicating with the bank, but this scheme brings another problem that the size of the coin is increasing during the process of transfer.

1.1. Our Contributions

In this paper, we present a provably secure and more practical e-cash system that is closest to the physical cash. In this system, the only trusted component is the blockchain and we achieve that:

- **transitivity**: the valid coins can be used further by the payee;
- **arbitrary amount of coins**: the user can withdraw arbitrary amount of valid coins from the bank;
- **prevent double-spending**: any user cannot spend a same coin twice;
- **fair exchange**: none of users can cheat in the trustless network.

1.2. Related Work

A complete e-cash system should satisfies: anonymity, transitivity, divisibility, the ability to prevent double-spending attacks and fair exchange among users. Now we describe the related works in the following aspects.

Transitivity means that, in e-cash system, the merchant (or payee) can spend the received coin further without depositing it to the bank firstly. Okamoto and Oha[4,5] are the first to propose transferable e-cash, but they only provided the weak anonymity. Then in 1992 [6] proved that the size of transferable coins is increasing during the transfer process. Baldimtsi [3] showed us the first transferable e-cash system that satisfies all of the anonymity properties and provides us with a new efficient double-spending detection mechanism, but the size of coins is increasing during the transfer process. The works [7,8] proposed a fully anonymous and transferable e-cash scheme that satisfies all the security properties, which can prevent double-spending attack with the help of blockchain. However, the size of coins is still increasing during the transfer process, and it presents a noneffective solution for this problem that, when the size reaches the upper bound, the user can deposit it to the bank and then the bank declares that this coin is invalid.

Divisibility means that the user can withdraw a unique coin of value \( \leq 2^n \) from the bank and spend it in several times to some distinct merchants. Compact e-cash allows the user to withdraw a wallet from the bank that contains \( 2^n \) coins in the withdraw protocol [9,10], however, this scheme only allow the user to spend one coin each time, which makes the scheme unpractical. Canard proposed the first efficient divisible e-cash system secure in the standard model [11]. And Tewari showed us the e-cash system that the user can withdraw arbitrary denomination of coin [7], which must be spent in one time.

Fair exchange between users means that, in the trustless network, the malicious user may refuse returning the corresponding message when he learns some knowledge. Constructing contracts on blockchain provides us with a feasible method [12,13] and the works [14,15,16] show us how bitcoin can be used in the area of MPC, where the fairness means that the dishonest users will pay a fine for the honest ones as a compensation. In the e-cash system the participants may face the following problem that shall the buyer pays the merchant first then the merchant sends the buyer
service or the other way around? Is there a way that none of the parties can cheat the other one? The works [17,18] used blockchain to achieve the fair exchanges among users.

1.3. Organization

In section 2, we review some classical definitions and notations. Section 3 describes the Bitcoin simply. In section 4, we present our constructions of the e-cash system. And the security proof and conclusion are showed in section 5 and 6 respectively.

2. PRELIMINARIES

2.1. Assumptions

Our construction is based on the following assumptions:

- The only "trusted component" is the Blockchain that each user has access to it (denoted by Ledger), and if a transaction is on the Ledger then it means that the transaction is provably valid. And the communication channel between users and Ledger is secure;
- The amount of coins that the user can withdraw is limited;
- The coin has \( l \geq 1 \) different denominations (to correspond with the physical cash, it can have other definitions) \( \text{Val}_1 > \text{Val}_2 > \ldots \text{Val}_l \) and the bank holds the corresponding signature key pairs denoted as \( (p_{k_1}, s_{k_1}), \ldots, (p_{k_l}, s_{k_l}) \);
- Each denomination has a fixed prefix and the form is \( \text{Value}, \text{serial number}, \text{signature}, \) i.e., \( \text{Coin}_1 = (\text{Val}_1, SN_1, \sigma_1) \) means that the denomination of \( \text{Coin}_1 \) is \( \text{Val}_1 \), its serial number is \( SN_1 \) and it can be provably valid with \( \sigma_1 \) and \( p_{k_1} \);

2.2. E-Cash system

As the traditional e-cash system [19,20], our scheme consists of two basic parties, the user \( U \) (or the merchant \( M \)) and bank \( B \), and the following algorithms:

- \( \text{ParamGen}(\lambda) \): on input security parameter \( \lambda \), the parameter generation algorithm outputs the system public parameters \( \text{par} \). We assume that \( \text{par} \) is the default input to the remaining algorithms;
- \( \text{KeyGen}((1^\lambda)) \): the key generation algorithm is executed by \( U \) and \( B \) respectively, and outputs \( (p_{k_U}, s_{k_U}) \) and \( (p_{k_B}, s_{k_B}) \), where \( (p_{k_B}, s_{k_B}) := ((p_{k'_B}, s_{k'_B}), (p_{k''_B}, s_{k''_B})) = ((p_{k'_B}, s_{k'_B}); (p_{k_1}, s_{k_1}), \ldots, (p_{k_l}, s_{k_l})) \);
- \( \text{Register}(B[p_{k_B}, s_{k_B}], U[p_{k_U}, s_{k_U}]) \): the registration protocol allows \( U \) to have an account in the bank and, at the end, both parties output \( ok \) for success or \( \perp \) for the failure of registration;
- \( \text{Withdraw}(B[p_{k''_B}, s_{k''_B}], U[p_{k_U}, s_{k_U}]) \): the withdraw protocol allows \( U \) to get the coins with value \( \text{Val} \), which can be provable with the fixed prefix and the signature of \( B \);
- \( \text{Spend}(U_1[\text{coin}, p_{k_{U_1}}, s_{k_{U_1}}], U_2[\text{coin}, p_{k_{U_2}}, s_{k_{U_2}}]) \): the spend protocol allows user \( U_1 \) with \( \text{coin} \) to buy the \( U_2 \)’s service \( \omega \);
- \( \text{Deposit}(U[\text{coin}, p_{k_{U}}, s_{k_{U}}], B[p_{k_B}, s_{k_B}]) \): the deposit protocol allows the user \( U \) to deposit \( \text{coin} \) to his account held by \( B \).
2.3. Digital Signature Scheme

A digital signature scheme consists of a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \((Gen, Sign, Ver)\) satisfying the followings:

- Key-generator algorithm \(Gen\): on input \(1^\lambda\), \(Gen\) outputs \((pk, sk)\);
- Signing algorithm \(Sign\): on input secret key \(sk\) and a message \(\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\), \(Sign\) outputs signature \(\sigma\);
- (Deterministic) Verifying algorithm \(Ver\): on input public key \(pk\), message \(\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\) and signature \(\sigma\), \(Ver\) returns output \(\in \{\text{accept, reject}\}\);
- For each key pair \((pk, sk)\) in the range of \(Gen(1^\lambda)\) and message \(\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\), the algorithms \(Sign\) and \(Ver\) satisfy
  \[
  \Pr[Ver(pk, \alpha, Sign(sk, \alpha))] = 1
  \]
  where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of \(Sign\) and \(Ver\).

2.4. Public Encryption Scheme

A public encryption scheme consists of a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \((EncGen, Enc, Dec)\) satisfying the followings:

- Key-generator algorithm \(EncGen\): on input \(1^\lambda\), \(EncGen\) outputs \((sk, pk)\);
- Encryption algorithm \(Enc\): on input public key \(pk\) and message \(\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\), \(Enc\) outputs a ciphertext \(c := Enc_{pk}(\alpha)\);
- Decryption algorithm \(Dec\): On input private key \(sk\), a ciphertext \(c\), \(Dec\) outputs \(\alpha' = Dec_{sk}(c)\).
- For each key pair \((sk, pk)\) in the range of \(EncGen(1^\lambda)\) and message \(\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\), the algorithms \(Enc\) and \(Dec\) satisfy:
  \[
  \Pr[Dec_{sk}(Enc_{pk}(\alpha)) = \alpha] = 1
  \]
  where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of algorithms \(Enc\) and \(Dec\).

2.5. Zero-knowledge Proofs of Knowledge

In the spend protocol, the user will use the ZKPoK to let the merchant believe that the coin exactly belongs to him and the merchant uses ZKPoK to let the user believe that he knows the service/witness \(\omega\).

A pair of interactive Turing machines \(<P, V>\) is called an interactive proof system for a language \(L\) if machine \(V\) is polynomial-time and the following two conditions hold:

- Completeness: there exists a negligible function \(c\) such that for every \(x \in L\),
  \[
  \Pr[<P, V>(x) = 1] > 1 - c(|x|)
  \]
- Soundness: there exists a negligible function \(s\) such that for every \(x \not\in L\),
  \[
  \Pr[<P, V>(x) = 1] < s(|x|)
  \]
\( c(\cdot) \) is called the completeness error and \( s(\cdot) \) is the soundness error.

Zero-knowledge protocol is the interactive proof system with zero-knowledge property, which means that the prover can convince the verifier that some instance \( x \in L \) without providing the verifier with any additional information beyond the fact.

A zero-knowledge protocol is called a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge if \( L \in NP \) and for every prover \( P' \) there exists a polynomial-time machine, called knowledge extractor, that can interact with \( P' \), and at the end it outputs \( x \). We follow the requirement in [16], without loss of generality, the last two messages in the protocol are challenge \( x \) sent by the verifier and prover’s response \( r \). The extractor extracts \( x \) after being given transcripts of two accepting executions.

2.6. Security Properties

In this section we give the security properties by redefining these of [3]. Firstly, we show the Oracles that the adversary \( A \) can interact in the security definitions.

- \( \text{Create}(1^{\lambda}) \) executes \((pk_U, sk_U) \leftarrow \text{UKeyGen}()\) and outputs \( pk_U \);
- \( \text{BRegister}(pk_U) \) plays the bank side in the Register protocol and interacts with \( A \). If \( pk_U \) has been in the bank database, then abort; otherwise, \( A \) owns an account in bank \( B \);
- \( \text{BWithdraw} \) plays the bank side in the Withdraw protocol and interacts with \( A \);
- \( \text{S} \& \text{R} \) is the Spend and Receive oracle that allows \( A \) to observe the process of Spend protocol between honest users;
- \( \text{UReceive} \) plays the merchant side in the Spend protocol and interacts with \( A \);
- \( \text{USpend} \) plays the user side in the Spend protocol and interacts with \( A \);
- \( \text{UDeposit} \) plays the user side in the Deposit protocol and interacts with \( A \).

Unforgeability means that the adversary \( A \) should not be able to forge a valid coin (the signature of bank) without communicating with bank or forges a valid coin according to the coins that he has owned so that to spend more coins than he has withdrew from the bank. We use the following experiment to define Unforgeability.

**Definition 1 (Unforgeability)** An E-Cash system is unforgeable if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary \( A \), we have the Expt\( _{unf}^A (\lambda) \) defines as :

\[
\Pr[\text{Expt}_{unf}^A (\lambda) = 1] < negl(\lambda)
\]

Preventing double – spending means that no user is able to spend a transaction twice. We use the following experiment to define Preventing double – spending.
Definition 2 (Preventing double – spending) An E-Cash system can prevent double-spending if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), we have the \( \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{PreDS}}(\lambda) \) defines as:

\[
\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{PreDS}}(\lambda) = 1] < \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

Anonymity. We define anonymity in three aspects as \{Observe – then – Receive, Spend – then – Spend, Spend – then – Receive\} [3] respectively.

Observe – then – Receive means that the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) cannot link a coin that he receives as a bank during the Deposit protocol or user during the Spend protocol to a coin that he observed transitivity between two honest users before.

Experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A},b}^{\text{OtR}}(\lambda) \)
- \( \text{par} \leftarrow \text{ParamGen}(1^{\lambda}) \);
- \( (\text{coin}_0, \text{coin}_1, \delta) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{Create},S & R}(\text{par}) \);
- if \( \delta = 1 \) then simulate \( \text{USpend}(\text{coin}_b) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \); otherwise, simulate \( \text{UDeposit}(\text{coin}_b) \) to \( \mathcal{A} (b \in \{0,1\}) \);
- \( b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{Create},S & R,\text{USpend,UDeposit}}(\text{par}) \);
- If \( b^* = b \), then return 1; otherwise, return 0.

Spend – then – Receive means that the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) cannot link a coin that he spent as a user during the Spend protocol to a coin that he receives during the Spend protocol as a merchant or during the Deposit protocol as a bank.

Experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A},b}^{\text{StR}}(\lambda) \)
- \( \text{par} \leftarrow \text{ParamGen}(1^{\lambda}) \);
- \( (\text{coin}_0, \text{coin}_1, \delta) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{Create},U\text{Receive}}(\text{par}) \);
- if \( \delta = 1 \) then simulate \( \text{USpend}(\text{coin}_b) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \); otherwise, simulate \( \text{UDeposit}(\text{coin}_b) \) to \( \mathcal{A} (b \in \{0,1\}) \);
- \( b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{Create},S & R}(\text{par}) \);
- If \( b^* = b \), then return 1; otherwise, return 0.

Spend – then – Observe means that the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) can not link a coin that he spent as a user during the Spend protocol to a coin that he observes the transitivity between two honest users.
**Definition 3 (Anonymity)** An E-cash system is anonymous if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, we have $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{OR}}_{\mathcal{A},b}(\lambda)$, $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{StR}}_{\mathcal{A},b}(\lambda)$ and $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{StO}}_{\mathcal{A},b}(\lambda)$ define as:

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{OR},\text{StR},\text{StO}}_{\mathcal{A},b}(\lambda) = 1] < \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

### 3. Bitcoin

Firstly, we recall the simplified version of bitcoin's transaction. Let $A = (A.pk, A.sk)$ be a key pair and the form of transaction that user $A$ transfers the coin with value $v$ to user $B$ is as following:

$$T_x = (y, B.pk, v, \sigma)$$

where $y$ is an index of the previous transaction $T_y(y = H(T_y))$ and $B.pk$ is the recipient of $T_x$. We also say that $T_y$ is redeemed by $T_x$. The transaction $T_x$ is valid if:

- $A.pk$ is the recipient of $T_y$;
- the value of $T_y$ is at least $v$;
- transaction $T_y$ has not been redeemed earlier;
- the signature $\sigma$ of $A$ is correct.

And there is also another condition that the transaction may have several "inputs" and we do not use this form in our construction so we will not describe it in details. Furthermore, we describe a more detailed version. In the real-world bitcoin system, the user has more flexibility in defining the conditions that how the transaction can be redeemed. The transaction $T_y$ contains a description of a function (output-script) $\pi_y$ whose output is Boolean and the transaction $T_x$ that can redeem $T_y$ if $\pi_y$ evaluates to true with input $T_y$. The transaction is defined as:

$$T_x = (y, \pi_x, v, \sigma, t)$$

Where $[T_x] = (y, \pi_x, v)$ is the body of $T_x$ and $\sigma$ is the witness that is used to make $\pi_y$ evaluates to true with input $T_x$. The scripts $\pi_x$ are written in the Bitcoin scripting language. The transaction $T_x$ is valid if:

- time $t$ is reached;
- $\pi_y([T_x], \sigma)$ is true;
- transaction $T_y$ has not been redeemed before.

In our construction, we define the transaction that is sent by bank $B$ as $T = (\land, \pi, v, \sigma)$ (the index of the transaction that $T$ redeems is empty) and we also define the transaction that user $U$ wants
to send to $B$ to deposit the coins as $T = (H(T'), pk_B, \sigma)$, where $T'$ is the transaction that be redeemed by $T$.

4. **A More Practical E-Cash System**

In this section, we present the detailed construction of a more practical E-Cash system, which satisfies the properties of transitivity, anonymity, preventing double-spending, the size of coin is fixed during the transfer process.

For our construction we have the following assumptions: secure channels for all the communications so that an adversary cannot overhear or tamper with the transferred messages; in the *Spend* protocol the user wants to buy the witness $w$ from $U_1$, which satisfies $U'$'s demand (i.e.: $U_1$ knows $x$ that $f(x) = true$ which is harder to find $x$ than verifying that $f(x) = true$ holds) with the value $Val'$ and in the process that $U$ proves knowledge of signatures and $U_1$ proves knowledge of the witness $w$ will by executing a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol with each other in the cut-and-choose technique, which is denoted as $\pi$.

Before giving the description of our construction, we show PoK of signature in details and PoK of witness $w$ is similar.

- $u_i$, divides each signature $\sigma_{i,j}$ to $n$ parts $\sigma_{i,j}^1, \ldots, \sigma_{i,j}^n$ and each part is committed separately by computing $\tau_{i,j}^k := \text{Commit}(\sigma_{i,j}^k)$, where $i = 1, \ldots, l, j \in \{1, \ldots, m_1\} \cup \ldots \cup \{1, \ldots, m_l\}$ and $k = 1, \ldots, n$, and sends the commitments $\tau_{i,j}^k$ to $U_2$;
- $U_2$ sends the set $J \subseteq \{(i, j, k): i = 1, \ldots, l, j \in \{1, \ldots, m_1\} \cup \ldots \cup \{1, \ldots, m_l\}, k = 1, \ldots, n\}$, where the size of each $J$ is smaller than $n_0$ so that $U_2$ cannot use any $n_0$-out-of-$n$ parts to learn any knowledge of $\sigma_{i,j}$ and $\lambda_{n_0}$ is predefined;
- $U_1$ opens the proper $\sigma_{i,j}$ according to subset $J$;
- $U_2$ verifies the openings.

Now, we present a more practical E-Cash system:

- $par \leftarrow \text{ParamGen}(1^\lambda)$: input the security parameter $\lambda$ output the public parameter $par$ and we assume that $par$ is the default input to the remaining algorithms;
- $(pk_B, sk_B) \leftarrow \text{BKGen}(1^\lambda)$: the bank generates the key pairs for different denominations as $\left((pk'_B, sk'_B), (pk_1, sk_1), \ldots, (pk_i, sk_i)\right) = (pk_B, sk_B) := \left((pk'_B, sk'_B), (pk''_B, sk''_B)\right)$;
- $(pk_U, sk_U) \leftarrow \text{UKeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: the user generates the key pairs as $(pk_U, sk_U)$;
- Registration($U([pk_U, sk_U], B([pk_B, sk_B]))$): the user $U$ sends $pk_U$ to bank $B$, if $pk_U \in \text{DB}$ (the database of the bank) then $B$ outputs $\perp$; otherwise, $B$ selects a nonce $\lambda_{\text{nonce}}$, computes $\text{ID}_U = H(pk_U||\lambda_{\text{nonce}})$, adds $(pk_U, \text{ID}_U)$ to DB and returns $\text{ID}_U$ to $U$;
- Withdraw($U([pk_U, sk_U], (pk'_U, sk'_U), B([pk''_B, sk''_B]))$): the user $U$ selects a new key pair $(pk'_U, sk'_U)$ and sends $(pk'_U, \text{ID}_U, \lambda_{\text{Val}})$ where $\lambda_{\text{Val}}$ denotes the amount of coins that he will withdraw from $B$. $B$ checks $U'$'s account and its balance, returns $\perp$ if one of them is invalid; otherwise, $B$ does the followings:
  - computes the number of coins with different denominations as $m_1, \ldots, m_l$;
  - computes signatures for each coin: selects $s \in Z_p$ (where $p$ is a prime) and computes $\sigma_{i,j} = \text{Sign}_{sk_1}(s||j||\text{ID}_U) \ (\sigma_{i,j}$ is the signature of the $j^{th}$ coin with denomination $\lambda_{\text{Val}}$), where $i = 1, \ldots, l, j \in \{1, \ldots, m_1\} \cup \ldots \cup \{1, \ldots, m_l\}$;
- prepares the transactions $T_{i,j}^U = (\lambda, \pi_{i,j}, Val_i, \sigma_{i,j}^U)$, where $T_{i,j}^U$ means the $j^{th}$ coin with denomination $Val_i$ is transferred and $\pi_{i,j}(T_{i,j}^U) = 1$ if $Verify_{pk'_{U_i}}[\{T_{i,j}^U, \sigma_{i,j}^U, \pi_{i,j}(T_{i,j}^U)\}] = 1$.

- broadcasts transactions $T_{i,j}^U$ and sends $Coin = (\sigma_{1,1}, ..., \sigma_{1,m_i}, ..., \sigma_{i,1}, ..., \sigma_{i,m_i})$ to user $U$.
- deducts user U’s account.

- Spend $(U_1[coin, (pk'_{U_i}, sk'_{U_i})], U_2[\omega, (pk_{U_2}, sk_{U_2})])$: first we assume that $U_1$ wants to buy a witness $\omega$ from $U_2$, whose value is $Val'$, so in this process $U_1$ transfers $Val'$ to $U_2$ and get witness $\omega$.

- $U_1$ computes the number of coins with different denominations as $m_1, ..., m_i$ and prepares the coins:

$$coin_{i,j} = (Val_i, SN_i, \sigma_{i,j})$$

where $i = 1, ..., l, j \in \{1, ..., m_i\} \cup ... \cup \{1, ..., m_i\}$. And then $U_1$ computes $\pi = PoK(\sigma_{i,1}, ..., \sigma_{i,m_i}; ..., \sigma_{i,1}, ..., \sigma_{i,m_i})$ and sends $coin = (coin_{n_1,1}, ..., coin_{n_1,m_1}, \pi)$ to $U_2$.

- $U_2$ verifies that $U_1$ owns $coin$ exactly, and then computes $h = H(\omega), \pi = PoK(\omega)$ and sends $(h, \pi)$ to $U_1$.

- $U_1$ verifies $(h, \pi)$ and prepares the following transactions:

$$PutMoney_{i,j}^U = (H(T_{i,j}^U), \pi_{i,j}, Val_i, \sigma_{sk'_{U_i}}, t)$$

$$ClaimMoney_{i,j}^U = (H(PutMoney_{i,j}^U), \pi_{i,j}^U, Val_i, \sigma_{sk'_{U_i}}')$$

where $\pi_{i,j}' = (\text{Verify}_{pk_{U_1}}(T_{i,j}^U) \land H(\omega) = h) \lor (\text{Verify}_{pk'_{U_2}}(T_{i,j}^U) \land \pi_{i,j}^U = (\text{Verify}_{pk'_{U_2}}(T_{i,j}^U)))$.

- $U_2$ prepares the following transactions:

$$ClaimMoney_{i,j}^U = (H(\text{PutMoney}_{i,j}^U), \pi_{i,j}^U, Val_i, \sigma_{sk'_{U_2}}, \omega, t_1)$$

where $\pi_{i,j}^U = Verify_{pk_{U_2}}(T_{i,j})$.

- $U_1$ broadcasts transactions $\text{PutMoney}_{1,1}^U, ..., \text{PutMoney}_{l,m_i}^U$ to the Ledger and computes $c = \text{Enc}_{pk_{U_2}}(\sigma_{1,1}, ..., \sigma_{1,m_i}; ..., \sigma_{i,1}, ..., \sigma_{i,m_i})$. If not all the transactions appear on the Ledger or $U_2$ does not receive the correct $c$ in time $t_1$ then the protocol halts.

- $U_2$ waits for all the transactions $\text{PutMoney}_{1,1}^U, ..., \text{PutMoney}_{l,m_i}^U$ appearing on the Ledger, he broadcasts transactions $\text{ClaimMoney}_{1,1}^U, ..., \text{ClaimMoney}_{l,m_i}^U$ to the Ledger, which will reveal the witness $\omega$. And if none of these transactions appears on the Ledger in time $t_1$, then $U_1$ broadcasts transactions $\text{ClaimMoney}_{1,1}^U, ..., \text{ClaimMoney}_{l,m_i}^U$ to get his coins back.

- Deposit$(U[coin, (pk'_{U_i}, sk'_{U_i})], B[pk_B, sk_B])$: before the Deposit protocol starts, we assume that Ledger contains transactions $T_i (i = 1, ..., n_i)$ (we also say that the number of coins that $U$ owns is $n_i$) and each transaction can be redeemed by $U$. First $U$ prepares the following transactions whose recipient is bank $B (pk_B)$, then $B$ adds the amount of coins to $U$’s account.

- $U$ prepares transactions $T'_{i,j} = (H(T_i), pk_B, Val_i, \sigma_{[T_i]})$, ..., $T'_{n_i} = (H(T_{n_i}), pk_B, Val_i, \sigma_{[T_{n_i}]})$ and broadcasts them to the Ledger, and sends $c = \text{Enc}_{pk_B}(\sigma_{1,1}, ..., \sigma_{n_i}, (pk_{U_i}, ID_U), (pk', sk'))$ to the bank $B$, where $(pk', sk')$ is the key pair.
that signs the $T'_1, ..., T'_n$, so that the adversary cannot disguise $U$ to let the bank to add the coins to his account because he does not know the correct key pair;
- $Σ$ waits the transactions appear on the Ledger and checks the received messages, if each of them is valid then adds the amount of coins to the $U$’s account, otherwise returns ⊥.

5. Security Analysis

**Theorem.** Suppose the Digital Signature Scheme, Public Encryption Scheme, Zero-knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and the bitcoin blockchain protocol are secure, then our e-cash system satisfies unforgeability, anonymity, transferability, divisibility, preventing double-spending attacks and fair exchange between users.

**Proof:** *(unforgeability)* According to the definition of unforgeability (Section 2.6), we give the proof of unforgeability into two parts.

**Part 1:** Let the adversary $𝒜$ to execute Create, Register and Withdraw protocols with the Oracle, we denote it as simulator $S$, without the knowledge of $sk_B$. By executing Create and Register protocols, the adversary $𝒜$ has an account in the bank’s database $DB$. Then at the end of executing Withdraw protocol with $S$, the output of $S$ is coin $= ((coin_1, σ_{1,1}, ..., σ_{1,m_1}), ...,(coin_l, σ_{l,1}, ..., σ_{l,m_l}))$. With the security of Digital Signature Scheme that, without the knowledge of signature key $sk_B$, $S$ can give a valid signature $S$ with negligible probability.

**Part 2:** Let the adversary $𝒜$ to execute Create, Register, Withdraw and Deposit protocols with the Oracle, we denote it as simulator $S$ with the knowledge of $sk_B$, and gets the valid coins coin $= ((coin_1, σ_{1,1}, ..., σ_{1,m_1}), ...,(coin_l, σ_{l,1}, ..., σ_{l,m_l}))$ and the valid transactions that can be redeemed by $𝒜$. Thus if $𝒜$ succeeds at this game, then $𝒜$ must redeem the same transaction twice and both are confirmed on the Ledger to accomplish the Deposit protocol. With the security of Bitcoin system, $𝒜$ can redeem the same transaction more than once with negligible probability. So in this game, $𝒜$ succeeds with negligible probability.

*(Preventing Double-Spending attack)* Let the adversary $𝒜$ to execute Create, Register, Withdraw and Deposit protocols with the Oracle to get the coins and transactions that can be redeemed by $𝒜$. Then $𝒜$ broadcasts two transactions that redeem a same transaction, so that the two transactions have the same “head” and, with the security of Bitcoin system, the probability that these two transactions appear on the Ledger is negligible. Thus in this game, $𝒜$ can succeed with negligible probability.

*(Anonymity)* In the definition of anonymity, we divide it into three parts $OtR, StR$ and $StO$. For $OtR$, we assume that the users communicate with other with a secure channel, so in the Spend protocol between two pairs of honest users $(U_1, U_2)$ and $(U_3, U_4)$, where $U$ pays $coin_1$ to $U_2$, $U_3$ pays $coin_2$ to $U_4$ and $Val(coin_1) = Val(coin_2)$. Thus, what the adversary $𝒜$ can observe are View$_1 = \{(PutMoney^{U_1} = H(T^{U_1}), π_{1,1}, Val(coin_1)), \sigma_1), ClaimMoney^{U_2} = (H(PutMoney^{U_1}), π_{2,1}, Val(coin_1)), \sigma_2)\}$ and View$_2 = \{(PutMoney^{U_3} = H(T^{U_3}), π_{3,1}, Val(coin_2)), \sigma_3), ClaimMoney^{U_3} = (H(PutMoney^{U_3}), π_{4,1}, Val(coin_2)), \sigma_4)\}$. Then $𝒜$ communicates with $OracleU$Spend$(coin_1)$ or $UDeposit(coin_2)$ and the view of $𝒜$ is View$_3 = \{(PutMoney^{O} = H(T^O), π_{5,1}, Val(coin_3)), \sigma_3), ClaimMoney^{O} = (H(PutMoney^{O}), π_{6,1}, Val(coin_3)), \sigma_6)\}$ or View$_4 = \{(PutMoney^{O} = H(T^O), pk_𝒜, Val(coin_3)), \sigma_7)\}$. Because View$_1 = View_2$, so $𝒜$ cannot link View$_3$ or View$_4$ to View$_1$ or View$_2$. As a result, in this game, $𝒜$ can succeed with negligible probability.

The same analysis method can be applied to the anonymity of $StO$ and $StR$. 

(Transferability, divisibility and fair exchange between users) The security analysis of transferability, divisibility and fair exchange can be reduced to the security of Bitcoin system. In this system, (1) the payee can use the coin further without depositing to the bank first by redeeming the transactions on the Ledger; (2) different coins have different denominations and each of them is transferred by an unique transactions so that user can spend arbitrary amount of coins; (3) the detailed form of bitcoin transaction allow us to define the conditions that the transactions can be redeemed. Thus, no user can cheat the others.

6. CONCLUSION

In this work, we develop a more practical E-Cash system that can be used to achieve unforgeability, preventing double-spending attacks, anonymity, transferability, divisibility, fixed size of coin during the transfer process and fair exchange between users. Our main contribution is to achieve the above security properties in one E-cash system. And the further work is to reduce complexity, e.g., in the Withdraw protocol, the bank signs every coin, so we assume that the amount of coins that the user can withdraw is limited and to achieve the real arbitrariness is the future works.

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